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Abstract This paper empirically investigates the economic and political factors that
affect a country’s likelihood to sign an arrangement with the IMF and the
determinants of the financial size of such a program. Arguably the world and the
global financial architecture underwent structural changes after the ending of Cold
War and so did the role of the IMF. Hence, we update and extend the work of Sturm
et al. (Economics and Politics 17: 177–213, 2005) by employing a panel model for
165 countries that focuses on the post-Cold War era, i.e., 1990–2009. Our results,
based on extreme bounds analysis, suggest that some economic and political
variables are robustly related to these two dimensions of IMF program decisions.
Furthermore, we show that it is important to distinguish between concessional and
non-concessional IMF loans.
Keywords IMF. Lending facilities . Extreme bounds analysis
JEL Classification O19 . F33
1 Introduction
When the International Monetary Fund (IMF) saw the light of day in the mid-
1940s, 29 IMF member countries signed the Articles of Agreement at first.
International trade in goods, services and especially capital was limited as a
consequence of the Great Depression and World War II. While one of the main
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objectives of the Fund has remained to help governments overcome temporary
balance of payments problems, its role in the world economy has changed
remarkably due to historical events of economic and political nature (see for
instance Boughton 2004). There have been different epochs in the history of the
IMF, but—at least—two structural changes during the last 20 years are worth
mentioning that initiated the latest era. First, the latest big influx of new IMF
members was associated with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of
communism. Within 3 years, membership increased from 152 countries to 172 at
the beginning of the 1990s and the IMF started to review and adapt its
organization. The IMF has now become a truly international financial institution
with 187 member countries. Second, developing countries increasingly liberalized
their capital accounts during the 1990s and the Latin American Debt Crisis was
finally resolved at the end of the 1980s, leading to increased and renewed access to
international capital markets for a number of emerging market economies. Both
developments have affected the role of the IMF by changing the nature and
resolution of financial crises and the size of IMF resources relative to private
capital flows.
Most of the empirical literature on the determinants of IMF involvement uses
data covering several decades of information, but fails to reflect these two
structural changes. Furthermore, as noted by Sturm et al. (2005), a wide variety of
economic variables has been suggested in the literature as determinants of IMF
involvement, but generally empirical studies focus on a limited number of political
variables (if any at all). We seek to reconcile these facts: Our study focuses on the
post Cold War period and builds on a rich set of political and economic variables
that also includes recently proposed variables for political proximity to major
shareholders at the IMF and variables related to the exchange rate regime, the
capital account side of IMF member countries and financial crises. The goal of this
empirical analysis is to carefully examine which of these variables are really robust
determinants of the likelihood that a country signs a new arrangement with the
Fund and the amount agreed under this arrangement. By robust we mean that a
specific economic or political variable should have a significant partial effect
(largely) independent of the additional control variables chosen. The extreme
bounds analysis (EBA) represents a fairly neutral means to check this form of
robustness and investigate the validity of existing findings in empirical research.1
We employ an EBA in order to examine which variables robustly explain IMF
involvement for a panel data set of 165 countries over the period 1990–2009. One
of the advantages of focusing on the post Cold War period is that it is a relatively
homogenous era in the history of the IMF. Except for Sturm et al. (2005) and
Dreher et al. (2009)—focusing on a different sample period and without looking at
the size of the program—an EBA has to the best of our knowledge not yet been
used to check for the robustness of a relationship between IMF involvement and
economic and political variables.
1 It is worth noting that our conclusions about the robustness of determinants of IMF participation are
conditional on the empirical models chosen. While our extreme bounds analyses are based on estimators
that are commonly used in the literature, it is beyond the scope of this paper to test for the robustness of
these results to for instance other estimators or functional forms. We leave this for future research.
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Our main results from the extreme bounds analysis suggest that a number of
economic and political variables indeed play a prominent role in signing an IMF
program and its size. These robust determinants of IMF involvement include among
others past IMF involvement and lagged legislative and executive elections (on the
political side) and the level of international reserves, real economic growth rates and
currency crises (on the economic side).
We contribute to the empirical literature on the IMF in three ways: First, this is
the first study that uses an EBA framework to examine the determinants of the size
of IMF loans, a topic that has received surprisingly little attention in the literature.
Second, we separately test for robust determinants of IMF involvement for non-
concessional and concessional loans. This distinction is potentially crucial, since the
demand for IMF loans and the supply of IMF loans might depend on the type of the
facility. Our results confirm this conjecture. Hence, pooling of data on IMF programs
can be problematic, since the determinants for non-concessional and concessional
loans vary substantially. These differences in results are best exemplified by GDP
per capita. Perhaps related to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative
and the wave of severe currency crises in the second half of the 1990s, this variable
in some specifications even significantly changes signs. Third, we update and extend
the work of Sturm et al. (2005) and also provide a summary table with the most
robust determinants of IMF participation by loan facility at the end of Section 4. We
hope that this list of variables serves as a useful guide for choosing control variables
in future studies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
variables that we take into account on the basis of previous studies. Section 3
explains the modeling strategy and Section 4 contains the empirical results. The final
section offers some concluding comments.
2 Economic and Political Determinants of IMF Involvement
We summarize all recent studies that we are aware of dealing with determinants
of IMF program participation since 2005, using similar criteria as Sturm et al.
(2005) who survey the literature up to 2005 (for further recent reviews, see for
instance Steinwand and Stone 2008; Bird 2007; and Conway 2006).2 The empirical
literature typically employs binary choice models (logit or probit) and defines IMF
program involvement as a binary variable that takes the value of one if either i) a
country participates in an IMF program in a given year, or ii) a country signs a new
IMF arrangement in a given year.3 In this study, we are interested in the latter case.
While Appendix A summarizes both types of IMF program participation, we select
those variables as our “core variables” that turned out to be most frequently used
by other empirical studies in a similar setting as ours (i.e., with a dependent
variable measuring the signing of new IMF arrangements and using data at an
annual frequency) and that tended to be significant determinants of IMF
2 For a review of the older literature, see Bird (1995) and Knight and Santaella (1997).
3 Beyond these two common definitions of IMF participation, Vreeland (2003) proposes to distinguish the
initiation of an IMF participation spell from the continuation of such a spell.
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involvement. Furthermore, we review the empirical literature on the size of IMF
programs in Appendix B. Since this aspect of IMF involvement has not been
studied by Sturm et al. (2005), we provide an overview of all studies that we have
been able to find (and not only the most recent ones).
Based upon this screening of the literature, we have selected 15 economic
variables for further empirical analysis. We discuss below why they can be expected
to be associated with IMF involvement, cite related recent studies and recall results
from Sturm et al. (2005). We start with three economic variables that have most
frequently been used in empirical studies on the determinants of IMF programs.
Given their frequency, we include them in all our tested models below.
Core economic variables:
& RESIMP (total reserves in months of imports): Countries with low levels of
international reserves relative to imports are more likely to face balance of
payments difficulties, are more vulnerable to speculative attacks and hence are
more likely to request and receive IMF credit.4 In Sturm et al. (2005), this
variable was robustly negatively associated with signing an IMF program.
& GRGDP (real GDP growth): Countries experiencing relatively weak growth are
more likely to face financial constraints and demand IMF credit. Furthermore,
low growth rates worsen a country’s ability-to-repay its sovereign debt. This
variable was another robust explanatory variable with a negative sign in the
extreme bounds analysis of Sturm et al. (2005).
& LGDPPC (GDP per capita, in logarithm): On the one hand, low-income
countries may be more likely to seek concessional Fund assistance and among
low-income countries poorer ones are more likely to sign concessional loans
within the framework of the HIPC-initiative. On the other hand, more advanced
developing countries with capital market access tend to be in need for non-
concessional loans and within this group a number of relatively rich emerging
markets like for instance South Korea or Brazil experienced severe currency
crises during the 1990s, calling for short-term non-concessional IMF assistance.
Hence, we expect that the sign of this coefficient depends on the type of IMF
facility (positive/negative for non-concessional/concessional loans). For the
overall sample Sturm et al. (2005) did not find that this variable was a robust
explanatory variable for the initiation of an IMF program.
Of course, there are many other economic variables associated to the signing of
new IMF arrangements. The following section summarizes the ones that we consider
in our empirical analysis.
Further economic variables:
& INVGDP (investment as percentage of GDP): A low ratio of investment to GDP
may indicate limited access to international capital markets, thereby making it
4 As an alternative we also experimented with total reserves scaled by total external debt. Both variables
are highly correlated. To circumvent multicollinearity problems, we do not include both variables, but opt
for RESIMP because it increases our sample. However, the qualitative conclusions are not affected by this
choice.
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more likely that a country requests Fund assistance. Investment was indeed
another robust explanatory variable with negative sign in Sturm et al. (2005).
& DEBTSERVEXP (debt service scaled to exports): A heavy debt burden relative
to national income increases countries’ need for external finance to service that
debt.5 For instance, Sturm et al. (2005) confirmed this prior.
& XDEBTGNI (external debt scaled to Gross National Income, GNI): First, a high
debt ratio may reduce the creditworthiness of the country concerned and, hence,
increase its demand for IMF credit. Second, so-called “highly-indebted poor
countries” are only eligible for debt relief, if they maintain macroeconomic
stability under a PRGF-supported program. Hence, we would expect a positive
sign for especially non-concessional IMF programs.
& XBALGDP (external balance on goods and services scaled to GDP): One of the
main objectives of the IMF is to assist countries to overcome their balance of
payments woes (see Article I of the IMF Articles of Agreement). In this vein, a
country that has a negative trade balance tends to need more financial resources
and is more likely to receive IMF credit.6
& GLOBEC (economic globalization as measured by the KOF Index of
Globalization): More globalized economies tend to be more prone to spill-over
effects via trade or financial links and hence the likelihood that an IMF program
is signed increases. On the other hand, economic isolation might more easily
create an environment in which domestic crises can occur.7
& TOTADJGDP (terms of trade adjustment scaled by GDP): A worsening of a
country’s terms of trade is likely to weaken a country’s external position, thereby
increasing the likelihood that it needs to seek Fund assistance.
& INFL (inflation): Countries experiencing high inflation are more likely in need of
IMF credit. However, the willingness of the IMF to provide funds may be lower
in case of high inflation.8
& DEFGDP (government budget deficit as percentage of GDP): High budget
deficits might increase the necessity for adjustment and governments are more
likely to turn to the Fund.
& STDEBTXDEBT (short-term debt scaled by total foreign debt): One of the main
lessons from the Asian Crisis 1997/98 was that not only the level of
indebtedness, but also its structure matters. A higher portion of short-term debt
implies that the roll-over risk increases and, hence, a country’s vulnerability to a
financial crisis.
5 We have also experimented with total debt services scaled by gross national income. Given its high
correlation with DEBTSERVEXP, we do not include this variable in our analysis. The qualitative
conclusions are, however, not affected by this.
6 As alternative we have also used the current account as percentage of GDP. The trade balance is
available for a larger set of countries and is highly correlated with the current account balance. We opt for
the trade balance in the results presented. The qualitative results are, however, not affected by this.
7 The KOF globalization index can be downloaded from http://www.kof.ethz.ch/globalisation (cf. Dreher
2006b).
8 Note that the inflation rate is highly correlated with the lending interest rate in a particular country
(ρ=0.77). For that reason, we opt to keep country-specific interest rate variables out of the analysis.
To reduce the influence of potentially outlying observations this variable is rescaled using the formula
x 1þ xð Þ= . For instance, Dreher et al. (2010) use this data transformation.
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& PEG (fixed exchange rate): On the one hand, a credible fixed-exchange rate
system can encourage international trade and investment. On the other hand, if
the pegged exchange rate system is inconsistent with a government’s current
domestic policy, the likelihood of a speculative attack and a request for an IMF
program increases. For instance, Bird and Rowlands (2009a) find evidence that
fixed exchange rates are positively associated with the signing of IMF
programs.9
& CURCRIS (currency crisis): A number of recent studies document that IMF
program involvement becomes more likely during currency crises (e.g., Elekdag
2008; Bird and Rowlands 2009b; and Breen 2010), where the IMF acts as a
lender-of-last resort. We follow Frankel and Rose (1996) and Laeven and
Valencia (2008) by defining a currency crisis as a nominal depreciation of the
currency of at least 30% that is also at least a 10% increase in the rate of
depreciation compared to the year before.
& FINOPEN (de jure measure for financial openness): Many emerging markets
liberalized their capital accounts in the 1990s, which not only allowed them
to better tap international capital markets, but also tended to be associated
with a higher probability of financial crises (if the reforms were not
accompanied by adequate financial supervision). We draw on an indicator
of capital account openness that was first introduced by Chinn and Ito (2006).
Higher values of the index indicate that a country is more open to cross-border
capital transactions.10
To mitigate possible endogeneity problems with the above economic variables,
we enter all of them with a one period lag in our models.
There is a growing consensus in the literature that the decision to sign an
IMF program is not only determined by economic but also by political
considerations. But while the literature has suggested various political factors
that may influence the decision-making process on IMF loans, there is little
agreement on which political variables to include. For instance Dreher et al.
(2009) and Reynaud and Vauday (2009) offer interesting new insights in the use
of IMF facilities by exploring the exogenous variation in temporary UN Security
Council membership and by gauging the geopolitical importance of the countries
turning to the IMF.
From our literature research we conclude that one political variable stands out
of the numerous political variables tested in recent studies in terms of frequency
used and its explanatory power. Therefore, we include this variable in each of
our models and consider an additional 14 political variables in our robustness
analysis.11
9 Trudel (2005) finds no direct effect of a fixed exchange rate on the likelihood of entering into an IMF
program, but documents an indirect effect by showing that the dwindling of international reserves only in
combination with a fixed exchange rate increases IMF participation.
10 On the homepage of Menzie Chinn (http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm), an updated
version of the data set of Chinn and Ito (2006) is available.
11 To cope with multicollinearity, for four groups of political variables, we only incorporate the first
principal component or averages in the EBA. Hence, we implicitly cover 24 political variables in our
analyses.
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Core political variable:
& UNDERIMF5MA (years under IMF—last 5 years, moving average): Once countries
turned to the IMF, there is marked persistence in IMF involvement, which is at odds
with the original IMF goal to provide temporary balance of payment support to
member countries. To capture this, we follow Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) using
the lag of a five-years moving average of a dummy indicating whether or not a
country was under an arrangement.12 The extreme bounds analysis performed by
Sturm et al. (2005) found robust evidence for such persistence in IMF programs.
Further political variables:
& LAGEXELEC/LAGLEGELEC (lagged elections for the executive and legisla-
tive, respectively): Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) argue that governments are
more likely to enter an arrangement right after an election, hoping that any
potential negative connotation with the program will be forgotten by the time
voters turn to the polls again, i.e., the next election.
& LEADEXELEC/LEADLEGELEC (lead in elections for the executive and
legislative, respectively): While various safeguards against the misuse of IMF
resources are routinely incorporated into IMF lending programs, Dreher and
Vaubel (2004) suggest that the availability of IMF credit might indirectly help to
finance electoral campaigns. They find that net credit supplied by the IMF is
generally higher before elections.
& POLINSTAB (political instability): Political instability is measured by the first
principal component of the number of political assassinations, revolutions, guerrilla
problems, government crises and the instability within the government as measured
by the percent of veto players who drop from the government in any given year.13
On the one hand, the possibility of blaming the IMF for the necessary adjustment
policies may be an incentive to resort to the Fund. On the other hand, the political
costs to negotiate an IMF program might be higher in unstable countries.14 The
results from Sturm et al. (2005) suggest that government instability is negatively
associated with signing an IMF arrangement.
& SOCUNREST (social unrest): Social unrest is measured by the first principal
component of the number of demonstrations, strikes and riots—prior to the
signing of an IMF arrangement. In general, the decision to involve the IMF
crucially depends on governments’ assessment of the political costs that may
result from the adjustment policies.
12 Some recent studies seek to empirically explain the duration and recidivism in IMF programs (see for
instance Bird et al. 2004; Joyce 2005 and Conway 2007). This dimension has not been subject to an
extreme bounds analysis yet. We leave this for future research.
13 Given the conceptual similarity and to circumvent multicollinearity problems we use principal
components analysis here. This is a statistical technique used for data reduction. The leading eigenvectors
from the eigen decomposition of the correlation matrix of the variables describe a series of uncorrelated
linear combinations of the variables that contain most of the variance. The first principal component
accounts for as much of the variability in the data as possible and is therefore taken to represent political
instability.
14 Dreher and Gassebner (2008) provide evidence that IMF and World Bank involvement increases the
likelihood of a government crisis.
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& LIBERAL (Freedom House index): We use the average of the political rights
index and the civil liberties index of Freedom House. Such a political rights
index could be positively or negatively associated with the Fund’s involvement.
Autocratic regimes might be more inclined to turn to the IMF, since the
perceived political costs are lower. But less democratic regimes also do not
necessarily “need” the IMF as a scapegoat to pursue potential reforms.15
& GLOBPOL (political globalization as measured by the KOF Index of
Globalization). Countries which are more integrated in world politics might
have better access to IMF credits.16
& ICRG (quality of government indicator as measured by the International Country
Risk Guide): We employ the mean value of the ICRG variables “Corruption,”
“Law and Order” and “Bureaucracy Quality” in our study, whereby higher values
mean higher quality of government. Starting from the mid-1990s several
international financial institutions started to act decisively against corruption.
Hence, we expect lower quality of government to be negatively associated with
IMF involvement.
& UNSC (temporary membership on the UN Security Council): Dreher et al.
(2009) show that temporary membership on the UN Security Council increases
the likelihood of these countries in receiving IMF support.
& RELSIZE (share in world GDP): This represents a rather crude proxy variable for the
systematic or geopolitical importance of a country in the world economy. If size
indeed matters for the IMF, then we would expect a positive sign on this coefficient.17
& TRADEUS (share of a country’s bilateral trade with the United States relative to
the country’s GDP): This measure proxies for political and economic proximity
to the United States. Since the United States are the only sovereign country that
holds a veto power at the IMF, proximity to the U.S. might increase the
likelihood of receiving IMF credit (see, e.g., Barro and Lee 2005).18
& VOTEINLINEUSA (vote in line with the United States): This variable captures
how often countries do vote in line with the United States in the United Nations
General Assembly. Once more, this can be seen as a proxy variable for political
proximity. We follow the definition of Thacker (1999) and code votes in
agreement with the United States as 1, votes in disagreement as 0, and
abstentions or absences as 0.5. These are subsequently averaged over a year.
One important pillar of our dataset consists of information about the timing and
nature of IMF lending arrangements. From the IMF website, we gather information
on a) the year in which an arrangement has been signed and b) the agreed amount of
money to be lent by the IMF during the arrangement. Appendix C gives the
summary statistics of all variables employed.
15 We have also experimented with the index of executive competitiveness. This variable is, however,
highly correlated with our democracy measure and therefore omitted from the analysis.
16 See footnote 7.
17 For a more sophisticated approach to geopolitical importance, see for instance Reynaud and Vauday
(2009).
18 Another potential variable that proxies for political interest is the bank exposure of the United States or
the G5 in a given country as recorded by the Bank of International Settlements (see for instance Oatley
and Yackee 2004; Broz and Hawes 2006; Copelovitch 2010). The results from Breen (2010) indicate that
the effects of bilateral trade and bank exposure on IMF program participation are very similar.
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3 Modeling Approach
To examine the sensitivity of the individual variables on signing an IMF
arrangement and its financial size, we apply (variants of) extreme bounds analysis,
as suggested by Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992). This approach has
been widely used in the economic growth literature. The central difficulty in this
research—which also applies to the research topic of the present paper—is that
several different models may all seem reasonable given the data but yield different
conclusions about the parameters of interest. Equations of the following general
form are estimated:
Y ¼ aM þ bF þ gZ þ u; ð1Þ
where Y is the dependent variable; M is a vector of ‘standard’ explanatory
variables; F is the variable of interest; Z is a vector of up to three possible
additional explanatory variables, which the literature suggests may be related to the
dependent variable; and u is an error term. The extreme bounds test for variable F
states that if the lower extreme bound for β—the lowest value for β minus two
standard deviations—is negative, and the upper extreme bound for β—the highest
value for β plus two standard deviations—is positive, the variable F is not robustly
related to Y.
As argued by Temple (2000), it is rare in empirical research that we can say with
certainty that one model dominates all other possibilities in all dimensions. In these
circumstances, it makes sense to provide information about how sensitive the
findings are to alternative modeling choices. Extreme bounds analysis (EBA)
provides a relatively simple means of doing exactly this. Still, the approach has been
criticized in the literature. Sala-i-Martin (1997) argues that the test applied poses too
rigid a threshold in most cases. Assuming that the distribution of β has at least some
positive and some negative support, the estimated coefficient changes signs if
enough different specifications are considered. We therefore report not just the
extreme bounds, but also the percentage of the regressions in which the coefficient
of the variable F is significantly different from zero at the 10% level. Moreover,
instead of analyzing just the extreme bounds of the estimates of the coefficient of a
particular variable, we follow Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) suggestion to analyze the entire
distribution. Following this suggestion, we not only report the unweighted parameter
estimate of β and its standard deviation, but also the unweighted cumulative
distribution function (CDF(0)), that is, the fraction of the cumulative distribution
function lying on one side of zero.19
19 Sala-i-Martin (1997) proposes using the (integrated) likelihood to construct a weighted CDF(0).
However, the varying number of observations in the regressions due to missing observations in some of
the variables poses a problem. Sturm and de Haan (2001) show that this goodness of fit measure may not
be a good indicator of the probability that a model is the true model, and the weights constructed in this
way are not equivariant to linear transformations in the dependent variable. Hence, changing scales result
in rather different outcomes and conclusions. We thus restrict our attention to the unweighted version.
Furthermore, for technical reasons—in particular our unbalanced panel setup—we are unable to use
extensions of this approach, like Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE), as introduced by
Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004), or Bayesian Modeling Averaging (BMA).
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4 Results
The main results of the extreme bounds analysis are summarized in Tables 1 to 6.
As discussed earlier, our choice of the economic and political “core variables” that
enter the M-vector is driven by the recent related empirical literature. Given these
core variables, our dataset includes annual data for 165 member countries over the
period 1990 to 2009. Our empirical results are structured along two main lines:
First, we distinguish between two different dependent variables. On the one hand,
we look for robust determinants of signing of an IMF arrangement by estimating
pooled logit models (for comparability with many studies) and alternatively
conditional fixed effects logit models. On the other hand, we analyze the robust
determinants of IMF loan size. Following important contributions in this strand of
literature, we use a Tobit estimator. Second, we investigate whether the
determinants of non-concessional and concessional IMF loans are the same.
Non-concessional loans are Standby Arrangements (SBAs), Extended Fund
Facilities (EFFs) and Flexible Credit Lines (FCLs) and concessional loans consist
of the Extended Credit Facility (ECF—formerly PRGF, poverty reduction and
growth facility), the Exogenous Shock Facility (ESF) and the Structural
Adjustment Facility (SAF). All our models include time fixed effects and standard
errors are clustered at the country-level.20
4.1 The Determinants of Signing an IMF Arrangement
Our first dependent variable concerns the signing of an IMF arrangement. We define
a binary variable equal to one, if a country signs a new IMF arrangement in a given
year and zero otherwise.
Table 1 provides the results of an extreme bounds analysis for two different
regression models. The results for the pooled logit model are reported on the left
hand side and the results for the conditional (country fixed effects) logit model on
the right hand side of this table.21 The first and second column in each block of
results refers to the average beta coefficient (Avg. Beta) and the average standard
error (Avg. Std. Err.), respectively. Then, the third column reports the percentage of
the regressions in which the coefficient on the variable of interest differs
significantly from zero at a 5% level (% Sign.). Our main attention is on column
four that shows the unweighted cumulative distribution function (CDF(0)). If an
explanatory variable has a CDF(0) of at least 0.95, we regard this variable as a
robust determinant of IMF involvement. Furthermore, columns five and six report
the lower and upper bounds for the coefficients. Finally, columns seven and eight
20 The only exception is the conditional fixed effects logit model for which we do not report clustered
standard errors. Note that the time fixed effects control for variables like the LIBOR (London Interbank
Offered Rate) or the number of countries that are under an IMF program in a given year.
21 Note that the conditional fixed effects logit estimator as proposed by Chamberlain (1980) is a
conditional maximum likelihood estimator based on a log density for country i that conditions on the total
number of signed IMF programs equal to 1 for a given country i over time. Since it is not possible to
condition on those countries that either never signed an IMF program or those that signed one in every
single year, these observations are lost. The sum of outcomes varies between 0 and 8 in our sample,
whereby 63 countries never signed an IMF program during the sample period.
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document the number of regressions (Comb.) run for testing each variable and the
average number of observations for each regression (Avg. Obs.).
The EBA for the conditional (country fixed effects) logit model shows that three
out of the four variables of the M-vector prove to be robust in the sense that their
CDF(0) is at least 0.95. To be more precise, lower import coverage and lower real
economic growth rates are associated with a higher likelihood of signing an IMF
arrangement. Furthermore, past IMF involvement conditional on having had any
IMF arrangement during the sample period reduces the probability of an IMF deal.
This is an interesting result, since it constitutes one of the main differences between
the pooled logit and the conditional fixed effects logit. In fact, the EBA for the
pooled logit finds past IMF involvement to be robustly and positively associated
with signing a new IMF arrangement. Hence, if we do not condition on the fact that
a country has signed at least one IMF program during the sample period—which is
highly correlated with past IMF involvement 22—we observe the persistence in this
latter variable. However, once we condition on the number of IMF arrangements, the
results show that having recently signed an arrangement reduces signing one this
year. Other than that, many of the results are pretty similar. For both types of logit
models we find that currency crises, lagged elections for the executive and
legislature and more autocratic countries are more likely to turn to the IMF and
sign a new deal. Beyond these considerable similarities, we additionally find that a
Table 1 Economic and political determinants of signing of IMF programs (EBA—logit and conditional
fixed effects logit)
Avg. Avg. Lower Upper Avg. Avg. Avg. Lower Upper Avg.
Beta Std.Err Bound Bound Obs. Beta Std.Err Bound Bound Obs.
underimf5ma 1.8004 0.4147 97.5% 1.00 -0.64 4.71 2625 1797 -2.3860 0.5587 100.0% 1.00 -6.55 -0.58 2569 1191
resimp1  -0.0515 0.0397 25.3% 0.88 -0.22 0.14 2625 1797 -0.1312 0.0670 73.3% 0.96 -0.44 0.43 2569 1191
grgdp1   -0.0575 0.0176 99.3% 1.00 -0.17 0.02 2625 1797 -0.0389 0.0182 78.8% 0.96 -0.19 0.04 2569 1191
lgdppc1  -0.2067 0.0735 68.0% 0.83 -0.77 0.42 2625 1797 -0.8383 0.9206 17.7% 0.82 -7.08 6.67 2569 1191
invgdp1  0.0025 0.0107 0.6% 0.61 -0.10 0.05 2324 1721 0.0135 0.0203 3.1% 0.73 -0.15 0.19 2197 1128
debtservexp1 0.0092 0.0050 62.6% 0.95 -0.02 0.04 2324 1374 0.0010 0.0079 0.0% 0.55 -0.03 0.06 2245 1120
xdebtgni1 0.0010 0.0006 64.8% 0.93 0.00 0.01 2324 1372 0.0001 0.0015 0.0% 0.52 -0.02 0.01 2281 1122
xbalgdp1 -0.0070 0.0048 39.8% 0.88 -0.05 0.02 2324 1759 -0.0020 0.0142 0.5% 0.52 -0.19 0.07 2277 1168
globec1  -0.0057 0.0071 3.4% 0.77 -0.04 0.03 2324 1594 0.0118 0.0203 2.3% 0.72 -0.17 0.11 2324 1091
totadjgdp1 -0.0082 0.0101 8.5% 0.71 -0.10 0.05 2324 1571 -0.0318 0.0219 46.8% 0.83 -0.29 0.08 2289 1070
infl1sc  0.0099 0.0053 60.8% 0.93 -0.02 0.03 2324 1685 -0.0112 0.0074 29.3% 0.91 -0.06 0.01 2270 1112
defgdp1  0.0106 0.0267 1.2% 0.63 -0.09 0.17 2324 849 0.0021 0.0441 0.0% 0.50 -0.20 0.26 2308 473
stdebtxdebt1 -0.0040 0.0079 0.2% 0.68 -0.03 0.03 2324 1375 -0.0192 0.0128 42.6% 0.92 -0.11 0.04 2275 1124
peg      -0.0206 0.1753 1.4% 0.52 -1.51 0.79 2324 1620 0.2547 0.3832 0.0% 0.75 -1.61 1.93 2324 1076
curcris  0.9885 0.2690 100.0% 1.00 -0.11 2.74 2324 1760 0.7829 0.2863 99.9% 0.99 -0.19 3.31 2285 1158
finopen 0.0472 0.0644 14.4% 0.71 -0.19 0.47 2324 1687 -0.1145 0.1175 9.5% 0.83 -0.69 0.59 2324 1106
leadexelec 0.1236 0.2243 1.2% 0.70 -1.05 0.92 2324 1744 -0.0901 0.2312 0.0% 0.63 -1.88 0.99 2279 1164
lagexelec 0.6813 0.2307 94.6% 0.99 -0.35 1.63 2324 1743 0.4617 0.2153 85.2% 0.95 -0.59 1.82 2278 1166
leadlegelec 0.0078 0.1913 0.0% 0.52 -0.89 1.06 2324 1744 -0.0998 0.1949 0.0% 0.69 -0.85 1.48 2279 1164
laglegelec 0.7665 0.1888 99.3% 1.00 -0.27 1.48 2324 1743 0.6584 0.1799 96.3% 0.99 -0.78 1.27 2269 1166
polinstab 0.0569 0.0585 13.4% 0.79 -0.21 0.35 2324 1117 0.0561 0.0860 0.0% 0.73 -0.30 0.45 2324 726
socunrest1 0.0849 0.0622 25.3% 0.90 -0.15 0.30 2324 1406 0.0872 0.0682 12.9% 0.89 -0.16 0.30 2324 908
liberal  -0.1095 0.0564 73.2% 0.96 -0.52 0.11 2324 1766 -0.3294 0.1323 97.3% 0.99 -1.18 0.23 2271 1170
globpol  0.0100 0.0048 70.6% 0.95 -0.02 0.03 2324 1666 0.0215 0.0142 58.4% 0.91 -0.11 0.09 2324 1104
icrg     -1.7156 0.6874 67.4% 0.89 -6.34 1.76 2324 1464 0.7178 1.2227 0.0% 0.72 -5.06 6.90 2299 992
unsc     -0.1861 0.3095 5.4% 0.68 -1.67 1.07 2324 1684 -0.1799 0.3547 10.9% 0.64 -1.86 1.46 2018 1108
relsize1 -0.1964 0.1805 40.7% 0.80 -1.34 0.76 2324 1769 0.7251 0.9544 0.0% 0.76 -2.51 5.44 2281 1176
tradeus  -0.5304 0.8701 12.9% 0.65 -5.85 4.02 2324 1694 0.7924 1.9440 1.8% 0.62 -8.69 32.59 2237 1141
voteinlineusa 1.4308 0.7672 38.1% 0.87 -3.07 5.83 2324 1759 1.9551 1.8428 11.3% 0.80 -10.81 18.16 2301 1174
Variable %Sign. CDF(0) Comb.
Logit – Further economic variables Conditional Fixed Effects Logit – Further economic variables
Logit – Further political variables Conditional Fixed Effects Logit – Further political variables
Comb.
Logit - Base model Conditional Fixed Effects Logit - Base model
%Sign. CDF(0)
Extreme bounds analysis (EBA) are based on (conditional fixed effects) logit regressions with time fixed
effects. Standard errors for the logit regressions are clustered. No distinction is made between concessional
and non-concessional loans
22 An alternative measure for past IMF participation is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a
country has been under an IMF arrangement in the past and zero otherwise.
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higher debt servicing burden and increased political globalization increases the
probability of an IMF program for the pooled logit model.
There are five important takeaways from this first table: First, the EBA shows
that a number of economic and political variables turn out to be robust in
explaining IMF involvement. Second, if we compare the baseline results from
this EBA with the results from Sturm et al. (2005), we see that the investment rate
and government instability no longer robustly explain IMF involvement. Third,
there are a number of new variables that we test for in this EBA that were not
considered in Sturm et al. (2005) and that either were used in other studies or are
expected to reflect the structural breaks in the international financial architecture
and the role of the IMF in the 1990s. Thereby, the economic variable that measures
currency crises is the only new robust explanatory variable. As expected, in times
of financial turmoil countries tend to turn to the IMF more often (and the IMF is
more inclined to provide assistance). To foreshadow some of the further results,
currency crises indeed prove to be one of the most robust explanatory variables for
IMF involvement after 1989. Fourth, lagged executive and legislative elections
prove to be one of the most robust political variables that are positively associated
with signing a new IMF arrangement. Finally, another very robust political variable
for the pooled IMF programs indicates that more autocratic countries are more
inclined to sign an IMF arrangement.
Next, we investigate whether the determinants of signing an IMF program depend
on the type of facility, distinguishing between non-concessional and concessional
loans. Table 2 reports the EBA results separately for these two groups, estimated
with country fixed effects.
We opt for this estimator, since the results are reasonably similar in Table 1 and
one of the strengths of this estimator is to control for unobserved time-invariant
country characteristics that might be correlated with the decision to sign a new IMF
program. Turning to the determinants of non-concessional loans first, we find that
many of the robust explanatory variables for the overall sample are relevant here as
well. Signing a non-concessional loan is robustly and negatively associated with past
IMF participation, real economic growth rates and becomes more likely for more
autocratic countries and in the year after legislative election. Furthermore, chances of
a new IMF deal clearly increase with the occurrence of a currency crisis. This pattern
seems to characterize a number of emerging market crises in the 1990s: When a
strong depreciation or devaluation of the exchange rate occurs—for instance forced
by speculative attacks—the affected country turns to the IMF for assistance.
In contrast to the non-concessional loans, we find relatively few variables that can
robustly explain the signing of concessional IMF loans. Only one economic and one
political core variable turn out to be robustly and negatively associated with IMF
involvement, namely past IMF programs and the ratio of international reserves to
imports. Beyond that, only one further variable can robustly explain concessional
IMF facilities: A legislative election in the year prior to the concessional IMF loan.
To sum up, while our EBA results detect a few robust explanatory variables for non-
concessional loans, the usual suspects for IMF involvement are only of limited help
in explaining the signing of concessional loans.
Before turning to our second dependent variable it is worth examining the most
robust explanatory variables jointly in a “normal” regression setting. We can give
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two different interpretations to this exercise. While the EBA tests for a large number
of different combinations of variables, here we only report a limited number of
combinations. In this sense, we demand less from the incorporated variables. But
since we include up to 10 variables as compared to five to seven variables in our
extreme bounds analyses, these regressions are in a sense also more demanding to
the variables. In Table 3, we report on the left hand side the four core variables of
our M-vector and on the right hand side extended models that include those further
economic and political variables that showed to be robust explanatory variables in
the extreme bounds analyses.
The first column in Table 3 shows the pooled logit results for the M-vector. Three
out of four variables are significant and all have the expected signs, which is in line
with many other studies surveyed in the Appendix A. Columns (2) to (4) use the
conditional fixed effects logit estimator for the overall sample, non-concessional loans
and concessional loans, yielding similar results for the core economic and political
variables.23 In columns (5) to (8) we augment the baseline regressions with those
variables that turned out to be robust in the EBA. If robust in the EBA then most of
these additional variables prove to be significant in this specific combination of
variables as well. The only exception is lagged executive elections. Finally, the lagged
GDP per capita variable proves to be the least robust variable in these specifications.
Table 2 Economic and political determinants of signing of IMF programs non-concessional/concessional
IMF programs (EBA—conditional fixed effects logit)
Avg. Avg. Lower Upper Avg. Avg. Avg. Lower Upper Avg.
Beta Std.Err Bound Bound Obs. Beta Std.Err Bound Bound Obs.
underimf5ma -1.2036 0.6518 59.7% 0.95 -5.94 0.89 2460 805 -5.6327 1.2444 100.0% 1.00 -24.39 2.56 2622 615
resimp1  -0.1229 0.0870 48.9% 0.89 -0.45 0.57 2460 805 -0.2514 0.1314 69.9% 0.95 -3.57 0.81 2622 615
grgdp1   -0.0615 0.0246 90.1% 0.98 -0.22 0.06 2460 805 -0.0258 0.0298 8.1% 0.74 -0.47 0.27 2622 615
lgdppc1  0.0827 1.3030 0.0% 0.51 -8.01 8.72 2460 805 -0.8929 1.5359 0.2% 0.74 -26.46 31.18 2622 615
invgdp1  -0.0222 0.0329 9.1% 0.75 -0.21 0.28 2186 765 0.0192 0.0284 9.0% 0.76 -0.39 0.49 2324 595
debtservexp1 0.0082 0.0104 0.0% 0.79 -0.05 0.06 2186 747 0.0116 0.0146 3.6% 0.68 -0.08 0.81 2323 603
xdebtgni1 0.0031 0.0035 0.0% 0.81 -0.02 0.02 2186 746 -0.0003 0.0022 0.5% 0.57 -0.06 0.09 2324 603
xbalgdp1 -0.0206 0.0207 11.3% 0.80 -0.34 0.07 2187 791 0.0132 0.0215 1.9% 0.67 -0.19 0.73 2324 603
globec1  0.0140 0.0265 0.0% 0.70 -0.25 0.16 2324 756 0.0331 0.0366 7.0% 0.82 -0.56 0.70 2324 538
totadjgdp1 -0.0514 0.0349 34.7% 0.92 -0.31 0.11 2187 735 -0.0315 0.0317 4.1% 0.71 -2.79 0.48 2324 532
infl1sc  -0.0153 0.0087 53.0% 0.94 -0.06 0.02 2180 759 -0.0057 0.0192 0.0% 0.69 -0.22 0.93 2320 555
defgdp1  0.0491 0.0524 3.2% 0.81 -0.25 0.28 2300 367 -0.0384 0.0834 0.0% 0.75 -0.99 1.68 2315 177
stdebtxdebt1 -0.0099 0.0149 0.7% 0.73 -0.10 0.05 2186 747 -0.0510 0.0378 18.5% 0.87 -0.77 0.22 2324 604
peg      0.7798 0.4391 76.2% 0.94 -2.E+00 3.E+00 2324 736 -3.0020 700.02 32.5% 0.87 -2.E+06 2.E+06 2300 537
curcris  1.4232 0.3725 100.0% 1.00 0.11 4.02 2186 779 -0.3899 0.5704 0.0% 0.73 -5.26 5.13 2324 605
finopen -0.0525 0.1493 0.6% 0.63 -0.90 0.79 2324 728 -0.1801 0.2267 0.4% 0.76 -5.87 1.61 2324 581
leadexelec -0.1271 0.3091 0.2% 0.63 -1.95 0.98 2187 785 -0.0350 0.3672 0.0% 0.54 -6.00 3.76 2324 600
lagexelec 0.4627 0.2869 55.8% 0.93 -1.00 1.78 2179 787 0.4395 0.3577 26.1% 0.85 -1.52 13.31 2319 600
leadlegelec -0.0573 0.2510 0.0% 0.59 -1.08 1.46 2186 786 -0.0985 0.3256 0.0% 0.64 -1.93 6.21 2324 600
laglegelec 0.4854 0.2309 87.6% 0.97 -0.53 1.53 2179 787 0.8172 0.2990 88.6% 0.97 -3.72 4.49 2322 600
polinstab 0.0773 0.0929 0.0% 0.79 -0.32 0.49 2324 481 -0.2094 0.3602 0.0% 0.72 -11.92 3.15 2323 372
socunrest1 0.0779 0.0809 1.8% 0.82 -0.22 0.32 2324 618 0.0759 0.1438 0.0% 0.71 -0.89 1.26 2323 447
liberal  -0.5018 0.1921 97.9% 0.99 -1.72 0.28 2186 793 -0.0254 0.2084 0.0% 0.59 -3.59 1.51 2324 605
globpol  0.0046 0.0181 0.0% 0.61 -0.12 0.08 2324 746 0.0278 0.0261 4.4% 0.82 -0.42 0.95 2324 572
icrg     0.7876 1.4917 0.0% 0.69 -5.50 7.55 2186 691 0.3465 2.6855 0.0% 0.53 -41.12 62.78 2324 460
unsc     -0.0828 0.4196 0.0% 0.56 -1.68 1.66 1481 696 -0.6620 0.7421 0.2% 0.79 -9.77 3.80 2324 596
relsize1 1.3256 1.0147 17.9% 0.89 -2.24 6.38 2180 794 -8.4482 26.629 0.1% 0.63 -205.00 333.91 2320 606
tradeus  2.3416 2.4976 8.4% 0.75 -7.5 35.30 2177 775 -6.2087 5.2514 10.2% 0.57 -1'033.2 200.76 2324 578
voteinlineusa 1.9550 2.7406 11.8% 0.68 -15.77 21.28 2187 792 0.9388 2.6998 0.0% 0.59 -57.02 58.74 2324 605
Comb.
Non-concessional loans - Base model Concessional loans - Base model
%Sign. CDF(0)Variable %Sign. CDF(0) Comb.
Non-concessional loans – Further economic variables Concessional loans – Further economic variables
Non-concessional loans – Further political variables Concessional loans – Further political variables
Extreme bounds analysis (EBA) are based on (conditional fixed effects) logit regressions with time fixed
effects. Standard errors for the logit regressions are clustered. Concessional and non-concessional loans
are estimated separately
23 Note that the observations on non-concessional (3) and concessional loans (4) for the conditional fixed
effects logit estimator do not add up to the overall number of observations (2), because some countries
receive a non-concessional and a concessional loan during our sample period.
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4.2 The Determinants of IMF Agreed Upon Loan Size
Our second dependent variable is defined as the amount of IMF credit a country and
the IMF agree upon in the year a new IMF arrangement is signed. This IMF loan
size variable is scaled by a country’s IMF quota and takes the value of zero, if no
new arrangement is signed.24 We start by investigating the determinants of IMF loan
size for all IMF programs in Table 4.
Two out of the four core variables are robust determinants of IMF loan size according
to the extreme bounds analysis. Past IMF involvement is positively associated with the
amount of the IMF facility and negative real economic growth tends to increase the loan
size. Furthermore, a country’s indebtedness as measured by its debt servicing capacity
(the debt servicing ratio) and currency crises also increase IMF loan size. Turning to the
political variables, IMF facilities tend to be higher in the year after an election (executive
and legislative), but not in the year before an election. This could be seen as evidence
that the Fund is more hesitant to provide lending before elections in order to not fuel
potential political business cycles or incumbent governments simply fear the political
costs of an IMF involvement shortly before an election. Finally, there are further robust
political variables: countries that are more politically integrated (KOF political
globalization index) and those countries with a more stable government (political
instability) are positively linked to IMF loan size. To conclude, many of the robust
explanatory variables for signing a new IMF program (pooled logit) are also robust
determinants for the IMF program size (pooled Tobit), even though the political dimension
apparently plays a bigger role, when it comes down to the size of the IMF program.
In the next step, we are once more interested whether the economic and political
determinants are different depending on the type of IMF facility. Table 5 allows for a
comparison between the EBA for non-concessional loans (on the left side) and
concessional loans (on the right side).
The examination of the four core variables already documents two interesting
differences. While past IMF involvement tends to lead to higher IMF facilities for non-
concessional loans, this coefficient for concessional loans is negative. Such differences
can be also found when we look at the impact of GDP per capita on IMF loan size. There
is robust evidence that poorer countries sign IMF deals for concessional loans that
guarantee more financial assistance, but richer countries are more inclined to sign a new
non-concessional loan. The last result highlights an important difference in the outcome
between non-concessional and concessional loans. Finally, real economic growth is
negatively associated with IMF loan size for non-concessional loans and low
international reserves are a robust explanatory variable for concessional loan size.
The differences between these two facilities are also reflected in the other
economic variables. While non-concessional loan size can be robustly explained
after the Cold War by debt-servicing and the occurrence of currency crises,
concessional loans are well explained by a low ratio of short-term debt to GDP. The
last result can be explained by the fact that poorer countries tend to have only limited
access to international capital markets. Hence, if such a country faces severe re-
financing problems, one might expect for these countries that international loans are
withdrawn altogether rather than that the maturity of loans is decreased.
24 South Korea and Turkey have signed the biggest IMF arrangements in our sample period.
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Turning to the results for political variables, concessional loans can be robustly and
negatively associated with the geopolitical importance as proxied by a country’s relative
economic size and lagged legislative elections. The latter variable is also the only robust
political factor in explaining non-concessional loan size. Furthermore, these IMF
facilities tend to be larger after an executive election, with rising political instability and
social unrest, with lower government quality and with a higher score in the KOF index of
political globalization. All in all, our results from the EBAs based on Tobit regressions
corroborate our earlier finding that only one “new” variable as compared to the study of
Sturm et al. (2005) turns out to be a very robust explanatory variable for the IMF loan
size: currency crises.
Table 4 Economic and political determinants of IMF programs’ size (EBA—Tobit)
Avg. Avg. Lower Upper Avg.
Beta Std.Err Bound Bound Obs.
underimf5ma 312.896 97.5134 95.7% 0.99 -135.90 942.10 2625 1798
resimp1  -6.9080 6.1944 21.0% 0.84 -36.75 22.68 2625 1798
grgdp1   -9.4807 3.2663 99.4% 1.00 -32.45 6.19 2625 1798
lgdppc1  -26.1043 14.3114 63.8% 0.74 -188.20 92.12 2625 1798
invgdp1  0.9188 2.0060 0.9% 0.64 -14.23 21.88 2324 1721
debtservexp1 3.5269 1.2793 98.3% 0.99 -1.48 10.96 2324 1374
xdebtgni1 0.1629 0.0970 62.6% 0.92 -0.52 1.86 2324 1372
xbalgdp1 -1.2722 0.8648 40.2% 0.88 -13.80 2.44 2324 1759
globec1  -1.6975 1.4214 23.0% 0.82 -12.57 3.89 2324 1594
totadjgdp1 -0.7626 1.4638 1.5% 0.63 -10.80 7.75 2324 1571
infl1sc  1.9119 1.1254 52.2% 0.92 -2.98 7.21 2324 1685
defgdp1  -1.6479 4.3041 0.6% 0.62 -22.81 13.95 2324 850
stdebtxdebt1 -0.1062 1.0830 0.0% 0.54 -4.1 4.38 2324 1375
peg      -20.830 32.262 0.2% 0.67 -276.95 117.63 2324 1620
curcris  157.311 51.343 100.0% 1.00 -19.73 619.67 2324 1760
finopen -3.818 13.424 2.4% 0.57 -61.05 60.25 2324 1687
leadexelec 10.5285 34.4238 0.3% 0.62 -181.58 175.02 2324 1744
lagexelec 93.8212 36.5669 89.4% 0.98 -95.50 362.89 2324 1744
leadlegelec -9.1429 30.5668 0.0% 0.60 -206.10 146.64 2324 1744
laglegelec 116.644 40.275 95.2% 0.99 -81.05 402.64 2324 1744
polinstab 21.7276 10.6462 77.3% 0.96 -14.83 61.68 2324 1117
socunrest1 12.4275 7.4004 52.8% 0.93 -15.42 40.06 2324 1406
liberal  -10.1901 10.2782 10.5% 0.80 -105.79 25.25 2324 1767
globpol  2.1836 1.0349 87.2% 0.98 -1.45 6.85 2324 1666
icrg     -404.931 165.761 68.9% 0.94 -1'679.2 248.97 2324 1464
unsc     26.820 63.105 0.2% 0.58 -226.59 448.90 2324 1685
relsize1 12.864 22.200 14.6% 0.56 -90.07 257.30 2324 1769
tradeus  -108.836 147.656 15.9% 0.70 -824.88 535.69 2324 1694




Variable %Sign. CDF(0) Comb.
Results are based on tobit regressions with clustered standard errors and time fixed effects. No distinction
is made between concessional and non-concessional loans
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We conclude our analysis by having a look at some “classical” regression results.
Table 6 displays the pooled Tobit results for the base model (on the left side) and the
extended model (on the right side) that additionally includes some further robust
explanatory variables from the EBAs.
In the base model, all four core variables are significant explanatory variables for
IMF loan size. The distinction between non-concessional and concessional loans in
column (2) and column (3) is again important and the same coefficients are relevant in
both the pooled Tobit and in the EBA. With respect to the augmented Tobit regressions
that include nine independent variables, it is worth mentioning that once more the partial
effect of the lagged election of the legislature apparently dominates the lagged election
of the executive, when both variables are tested for in the same specification.
In future studies of IMF participation, researchers should be guided, of course, by
the specific theory being tested when they choose what control variables to include.
But our study suggests that there are certain variables that are too important to be
ignored as potential determinants. Table 7 provides a summary of the most robust
determinants of IMF lending activities.
5 Concluding Comments
The public and academic debate about the activity of the International Monetary Fund
has once more regained momentum during the late 1990s and the beginning of the new
century. A wide range of political and economic variables have been proposed in a
number of empirical studies. The goal of our paper is a modest and an important one at
the same time. This paper empirically investigates the robust economic and political
Table 5 Economic and political determinants of non-concessional/concessional IMF programs’ size
(EBA—Tobit)
Avg. Avg. Lower Upper Avg. Avg. Avg. Lower Upper Avg.
Beta Std.Err Bound Bound Obs. Beta Std.Err Bound Bound Obs.
underimf5ma 585.898 151.642 99.8% 1.00 -74.07 1'530.7 2625 1695 -49.287 94.304 27.8% 0.82 -172'767 173'006 2604 1644
resimp1  -0.9782 8.3159 0.9% 0.54 -41.60 47.42 2625 1695 -16.1844 5.9439 98.9% 1.00 -4'757.18 4'708.08 2604 1644
grgdp1   -15.5352 4.9124 97.8% 1.00 -38.31 10.19 2625 1695 -1.6851 1.5610 22.0% 0.80 -295.72 289.74 2604 1644
lgdppc1  62.3912 27.1504 62.2% 0.89 -119.84 287.69 2625 1695 -75.6246 15.9812 99.8% 1.00 -26'995.1 26'935.4 2604 1644
invgdp1  0.2874 3.4043 1.9% 0.53 -19.11 27.67 2324 1621 1.9841 3.1558 74.9% 0.94 -3'547.15 3'556.61 2313 1575
debtservexp1 4.4507 1.6186 97.4% 0.99 -1.88 13.02 2324 1273 0.2771 0.6714 1.6% 0.63 -176.09 181.67 2324 1231
xdebtgni1 0.0037 0.1816 1.6% 0.54 -1.67 2.29 2324 1271 0.1310 0.1517 55.2% 0.93 -330.29 331.60 2324 1230
xbalgdp1 -0.8792 1.5468 3.1% 0.69 -15.80 7.10 2324 1658 -1.1595 1.3903 58.0% 0.92 -1'814.32 1'810.03 2324 1611
globec1  -3.1835 2.3767 30.9% 0.85 -19.52 4.87 2324 1501 0.4550 1.6428 3.5% 0.71 -1'451.27 1'448.91 2324 1449
totadjgdp1 -2.3004 2.9218 7.4% 0.75 -19.61 11.43 2324 1479 -0.7754 2.9500 10.0% 0.70 -7'752.92 7'746.73 2310 1425
infl1sc  2.8778 1.5400 58.3% 0.92 -3.63 10.43 2324 1591 -0.8646 1.3524 27.3% 0.82 -2'122.46 2'125.80 2311 1537
defgdp1  1.1487 5.8566 0.8% 0.58 -25.55 26.48 2324 815 5.2668 27.9940 49.4% 0.81 -28'995.4 29'008.3 2323 764
stdebtxdebt1 1.6267 1.3262 15.5% 0.87 -3.30 7.32 2324 1274 -2.9785 1.0945 96.6% 0.99 -9.69 1.31 2324 1232
peg      -23.4499 52.1845 0.0% 0.62 -335.04 161.45 2324 1530 -15.7161 43.3879 4.5% 0.73 -31'481.0 31'364.6 2324 1479
curcris  282.331 74.3564 100.0% 1.00 -2.77 785.37 2324 1659 -16.502 35.3865 3.5% 0.66 -3'242.40 3'191.79 2324 1614
finopen -13.1951 23.2091 0.4% 0.64 -108.87 81.98 2324 1590 7.9930 31.8294 30.1% 0.87 -80'809.4 80'797.2 2324 1554
leadexelec 6.5532 46.9338 2.7% 0.55 -271.96 199.45 2324 1643 7.1180 36.3848 6.3% 0.61 -16'877.2 16'935.3 2324 1597
lagexelec 123.418 49.2904 92.9% 0.98 -132.86 425.67 2324 1643 41.774 113.3319 59.6% 0.91 -345'830 345'995 2313 1593
leadlegelec -11.4333 42.3702 0.0% 0.60 -272.08 171.56 2324 1643 -8.4860 23.3311 4.7% 0.64 -9'600.65 9'598.14 2324 1597
laglegelec 124.492 54.7486 87.9% 0.98 -119.89 472.80 2324 1643 67.991 33.0218 98.6% 1.00 -21'862.8 22'023.2 2313 1593
polinstab 38.9037 11.9713 100.0% 1.00 -5.24 94.51 2324 1048 -19.1062 10.8727 68.0% 0.92 -981.78 964.23 2324 1005
socunrest1 22.3892 9.9333 86.8% 0.97 -14.81 62.07 2324 1324 6.8068 6.7728 15.1% 0.82 -2'380.79 2'406.05 2324 1270
liberal  -5.6313 16.7856 1.8% 0.59 -141.32 58.25 2324 1665 -6.3765 20.1787 49.9% 0.86 -20'006 20'081 2324 1618
globpol  3.5610 1.6864 83.6% 0.97 -1.87 12.36 2324 1568 0.0929 1.0106 8.1% 0.55 -887.04 887.12 2324 1521
icrg     -703.877 271.200 69.3% 0.96 -2'337.3 320.30 2324 1386 2.329 200.947 7.6% 0.54 -211'999 211'477 2324 1333
unsc     46.0593 79.7384 0.0% 0.63 -229.49 554.74 2324 1586 -24.0813 45.4808 7.8% 0.66 -2'289.93 2'392.60 2324 1542
relsize1 13.771 26.025 54.8% 0.60 -99.8 306.09 2324 1667 -311.183 254.629 51.0% 0.95 -184'622 183'669 2323 1621
tradeus  -150.401 207.497 28.8% 0.66 -1'201.4 795.58 2324 1596 33.016 349.602 7.4% 0.64 -670'106 669'509 2324 1549
voteinlineusa 66.871 216.882 30.4% 0.51 -1'149.2 1'371.05 2324 1658 138.952 264.247 66.9% 0.89 -753'039 752'938 2324 1611
Comb.
Non-concessional loans - Base model Concessional loans - Base model
%Sign. CDF(0)Variable %Sign. CDF(0) Comb.
Non-concessional loans – Further economic variables Concessional loans – Further economic variables
Non-concessional loans – Further political variables Concessional loans – Further political variables
Extreme bounds analysis (EBA) are based on tobit regressions with clustered standard errors and time
fixed effects. Concessional and non-concessional loans are estimated separately
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factors that affect a country’s likelihood to sign an arrangement with the IMF and the
determinants of the financial size of such a program. By robust we mean that economic
and political variables should have a significant partial effect (largely) independent of
additional control variables chosen. The extreme bounds analysis (EBA) exactly fulfills
this requirement. Hence, we update and extend the work of Sturm et al. (2005) by
employing a panel model for 165 countries that focuses on the post-Cold War era, i.e.,
1990–2009. Important structural changes at the beginning of the 1990s that affected
the global financial architecture and the role of the IMF alike called for a thorough
examination of robust political and economic determinants of IMF involvement.
Our results, based on extreme bounds analysis, suggest that some of themost important
economic and political explanatory variables of IMF program participation are past IMF
involvement, lagged legislative and executive elections and—to a smaller extent—a
proxy for how autocratic a country is (on the political side) and the level of international
reserves, real economic growth rates and currency crises (on the economic side).
This study contributes to the literature in three ways: First, the determinants of the
signing of IMF arrangements and the size of such loans are examined and largely
Table 6 Economic and political determinants of IMF programs' size (Tobit)
Panel A: Base model Panel B: Extended model
Variable all programs non-concess. concessional all programs non-concess. concessional
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
underimf5ma 463.5977*** 883.7835*** −30.0621 100.0093* 207.1867** −61.7040
(108.0944) (171.5551) (43.7099) (53.9511) (79.0971) (45.8595)
resimp1 −9.6892 −1.7782 −15.9875*** −11.2789* −12.1692 −15.0053***
(6.4857) (8.6844) (4.2347) (5.1040) (8.6337) (4.3391)
grgdp1 −9.7400** −17.9269*** −1.0287 −6.0047* −11.7394** −0.4268
(2.9900) (4.5700) (1.3265) (2.6016) (4.1148) (1.3117)
lgdppc1 −59.4473*** 19.2611 −84.3246*** 6.4733 106.9349*** −72.1570***
(12.4866) (19.1699) (8.3046) (9.9022) (27.5382) (8.9816)
debtservexp1 2.7740** 3.2864* 0.1108
(1.0463) (1.3791) (0.4885)
curcris 85.1518** 160.9079*** −22.3772
(31.1132) (41.2452) (32.3920)
lagexelec 10.1508 26.6723 −1.2868
(27.1283) (33.0880) (27.7164)
laglegelec 76.5032** 58.1691* 67.3587**
(23.6788) (31.2711) (21.3861)
globalpol 1.5997* 2.8442* −0.0715
(0.7563) (1.3522) (0.4808)
No. of obs. 2753 2615 2560 1608 1485 1449
Uncensored 331 193 138 282 159 123
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.07
***, **, * represents a significant coefficient at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively
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comparable (when we compare the results from the pooled logit and Tobit results), even
though political factors tend to matter more for the size of the loan than for its signature.
Second, we document that the pooling of non-concessional and concessional loans can
be problematic, since the determinants vary substantially by facility type. These
differences in results are best exemplified by GDP per capita. Perhaps related to the
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and the wave of severe currency crises
in the second half of the 1990s, this variable in some specifications even significantly
changes signs. Third, we offer a summary of the most robust political and economic
determinants of IMF participation by loan facility (Table 7). We hope that this list of
variables serves as a useful guide for choosing control variables in future studies.
Acknowledgements We would like to thank two anonymous referees, Axel Dreher, Martin Gassebner,
Michael Lamla, and James Vreeland for fruitful discussions and participants of the conference on “The
Political Economy of International Financial Institutions” in Tübingen (10–13 June 2010) for helpful
comments. All remaining errors are ours.







Panel A: Signing of IMF Programs (Conditional fixed effects logit)
Past IMF participation − − −
International reserves − −
GDP growth (real) − −
Currency crisis + +
Elections (executive, lagged) +
Elections (legislative, lagged) + + +
Liberal − −
Panel B: Loan Size of IMF Programs (Tobit)
Past IMF participation + +
International reserves −
GDP growth (real) − −
GDP per capita (real) −
Debt servicing + +
Short-term debt −
Currency crisis + +
Elections (executive, lagged) + +
Elections (legislative, lagged) + + +
Political instability + +
Social unrest +
Political globalization (KOF) + +
Government quality (ICRG) −
Geopolitical importance −
If an explanatory variable never has a CDF(0) above 0.95 within a given panel, it is not displayed here
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